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The induced demand model postulates that physicians respond to adverse income shocks 
by electing to perform more remunerative procedures. Recent work verifies the 
predictions of this model, finding a strong shift away from natural deliveries to the more 
highly reimbursed cesarean delivery in response to exogenous reductions in the fertility 
rate between 1970-1982. In light of this, the 10.1 percent reduction in fertility rates and 
contemporaneous 13.3 percent decline in cesarean rates between 1989-1996 appears to 
contradict the induced demand hypothesis.  This paper reconciles the observed 
phenomenon by examining the role of the dramatic growth in managed care activity in 
this time period. We argue that while the inducement effect of declining fertility was 
pervasive in this period, its effect on cesarean rates was offset by the dramatic growth in 
managed care beginning in the late 1980s. Central to our argument is the removal of 
physician financial incentives in delivery choice under managed care. Using county-level 
data for a subset of this time period and instrumental variables estimators, we find a 
strong negative association between managed care growth and cesarean rates that persists 
despite controls for fertility, birth severity, risk factors, demographics, state fixed effects 
and hospital characteristics. 
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1 Introduction
There is widespread belief and some empirical evidence that a high fraction of cesarean-section
deliveries result from the demand inducing behavior of obstetricians/gynecologists (henceforth
ob/gyns). Theories of induced demand suggest that physicians derive utility from income and
leisure but disutility from inducement, perhaps as a result of ethical considerations or reputation
eﬀects; e.g., Dranove (1988). A straightforward implication of these models is that when income
is tailored to specific medical procedures, physicians will abuse their role as informed agents
to their patients by inducing demand for the more remunerative procedure until its marginal
benefit equalizes the associated marginal costs.
Induced demand raises obvious ethical issues, but is also central to the health care reform
debate. If there is little evidence of the benefits of alternate, more expensive medical technologies
relative to their costs it bears upon health policy to evaluate and realign the financial incentives
facing physicians with alternate compensation schemes. In recent years, various policies to
restructure the reimbursement of deliveries and reorganize the practice environment for obstetrics
have been widely discussed; see e.g., Myers and Gleicher (1993), CDC (1993). The evaluation of
such policies rests on evidence that quantifies the links between both obstetrics’ delivery choices
and their practice environment on one hand, and the links between neo-natal/maternal health
outcomes and the practice environment on the other. This paper provides some evidence in this
context.
The delivery of babies has been a natural testing ground for induced demand models, most
recently by Gruber and Owings (1996); see also Staﬀord (1990), Dranove and Wehler (1994).
In the early 1990s cesareans not only reimbursed ob/gyns $611 more on average than a natural
delivery (CDC, 1993), they also required less time on average allowing an ob/gyn higher utility
for inducing demand for cesareans until the marginal utility from a higher income and a reduced
work load equalized the marginal disutility of inducement.1 Over the 1965-1985 period cesarean
deliveries in the United States rose from just 5 percent to 22 percent of all deliveries, while
U.S fertility rates contemporaneously fell over 13 percent (National Center for Health Statistics
(NCHS), 1994). Gruber and Owings (1996) conclude that it was this exogenous source of income-
1Although cesareans on average cost $7826 versus $4720 for a natural delivery in 1991, the diﬀerence in ob/gyn
fees is only $611 because of more expensive inputs in cesarean delivery. Another factor that may be of importance
in deciding between a cesarean-section versus a vaginal delivery is that cesareans can be scheduled, oﬀering the
ob/gyns a non-pecuniary benefit from electing a cesarean delivery. Raw means in my data shows that amongst
cesarean deliveries, an average of 35.7 percent more babies were born on Friday than on another day of the week
suggesting that ob/gyns are scheduling a larger fraction of cesarean deliveries just prior to the weekend (see Table
1).
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pressure that led ob/gyns to substitute towards the more highly reimbursed cesarean deliveries,
driving up the cesarean-section rate.
At the outset, the decline in cesarean rates between 1989 and 1996 would appear to contradict
the induced demand model. Figure 1 shows that in this period U.S. fertility rates fell 10.1
percent heralding a negative financial shock to ob/gyns, but concurrently U.S. cesarean rates
fell 13.3 percent contradicting the central premise of the induced-demand hypothesis. This paper
attempts to reconcile the observed phenomenon by examining the role of the contemporaneous
growth in managed care activity. Shown in Figure 1, Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs)
grew from serving 8 percent of the health insurance industry in 1986 to 25.3 percent in 1996
(HIAA, 1996). We argue that while the inducement eﬀect of declining fertility was pervasive in
this period, its eﬀect on cesarean delivery rates was oﬀset by a corresponding reverse eﬀect on
cesarean rates due to the dramatic rise in managed care activity beginning in the late 1980s.
The simple premise underlying this argument is the capitation of physician fees in managed
care; i.e., reimbursement fees are fixed and determined prospectively, typically independent of
the volume of medical service provided. In the context of deliveries managed care reimburses
cesareans and natural deliveries equally, permitting a managed care ob/gyn no direct pecuniary
benefit from inducing demand for a cesarean.2 There is also evidence that managed care directly
or implicitly imposes high penalties on physicians who consistently violate the cost conservative
practice patterns preferred by managed care (Robinson and Steiner, 1998). It is plausible there-
fore that by severing the financial link between delivery and income and altering the practice
environment facing ob/gyns, the dramatic growth in managed care activity in the late 1980s
and early 1990s played a role in the large decline in the national cesarean rate.
In testing for a causal role of managed care activity on the cesarean rate, we examine the em-
pirical link between HMO market shares (measured as the fraction of a local market’s population
enrolled in HMO insurance) and the local cesarean rate, conditional on fertility, hospital size,
risk factors, demographics and other determinants of the cesarean rate. Due to data limitations,
this study will focus on the 1991-1992 time period in which cesarean rates fell 8.5 percent from
its highest rate in 1989, fertility declined by 3 percent, and HMO activity contemporaneously
grew over 15 percent.
2Of course there may be other nonpecuniary benefits such as additional leisure and scheduling conveniences
that may lead managed care ob/gyns to induce demand on the margin; however, one might expect that the
inducement eﬀect arising from these factors to be second order relative to the inducement eﬀect arising from
higher income. Also, while cesareans on average take a shorter time to perform than deliveries with extended
labor, it is plausible that physicians do not measure leisure purely in time input but take into account the stress
of cesarean surgery and the exposure to legal risk from performing cesareans; see, e.g., Keeler and Brodie (1993).
In this case managed care ob/gyns may not even receive much nonpecuniary benefit from inducing demand.
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We use information about HMO activity at the county level collected by the American As-
sociation of Health Plans (AAHP); the remaining data are primarily from the National Center
for Health Statistics (NCHS) which documents detailed parental, hospital and birth character-
istics of each delivery in a birthing center in the U.S. These data are aggregated to the county
level to match the unit of observation of the HMO data. We are aware of the possible endoge-
nous determination of HMO market shares, and our empirical analysis addresses this issue using
large across-state variations in laws that regulate the entry, expansion and operation of managed
care. Our results are driven largely by the tremendous across-county variation in managed care
activity, although the use of two years’ data also gives us a small degree of across-time variation.
We find strong evidence that cesarean rates are negatively correlated with the growth in
HMO activity. This relationship persists despite controls for risk factors, birth severity, hospital
size, region, income and demographic factors, but attenuates somewhat when controlling for
female labor force attachment. In particular, we find that fertility continues to exert an induced
demand for cesareans, but that its eﬀect is swamped out by the opposite eﬀect from managed
care. This result supports the hypothesis that altered financial incentives introduced by managed
care played a role in the reduction of cesarean rates. Our results suggest that a 1 percentage
point increase in HMO market shares is associated with a decrease of between 4 and 6 percent
in cesarean rates at 1992 cesarean levels. The paper also assesses whether increased managed
care activity in 1991-1992 is associated with tandem declines in quality of births. Focussing on
neo-natal infant mortality, Apgar scores and birth injury/complication rates we find no such
evidence.
The paper proceeds by describing, in Section 2, the trends in health insurance markets,
managed care activity and cesarean births, also describing the mechanisms that lend a causal
role for managed care activity in the reduction of the cesarean rate. Next in Section 3 we present
a theoretical framework to examine the eﬀects of changing HMOmarket shares on cesarean rates,
summarize its main implications, and review the related literature. Section 4 describes the data,
the empirical methodology, and the empirical results. Conclusions follow.
2 Health Insurance Markets and Cesarean Sections
2.1 Background and Trends
During the 1980s managed care enrollments grew rapidly from less than 10 million in 1980 dis-
tributed over only 30 HMOs, to over 40 million members by 1992 distributed over 230 HMOs
(HIAA, 1996). The number of enrolled members represented 25 percent of the insured popu-
lation in 1992, and dipped slightly thereafter (AAHP, 1994). Over this time period, a number
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of organizations that combined features of both traditional indemnity insurance and traditional
HMOs, e.g., Point of Service (POS) plans, Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs) and In-
dependent Practice associations (IPAs) also emerged, in which 22.26 percent of the population
was enrolled by 1994 (AAHP, 1994). Since many of the newer organizational structures blur the
original distinction between managed care and traditional indemnity insurance, only those or-
ganizations listed specifically as HMOs are used in the definition of managed care in the current
work, and the terms “HMO” and “managed care” are used synonymously.
What led to this dramatic growth in HMOs? In contrast to the voluminous literature on the
consequences of growing managed care activity,3 little academic attention has been given to the
causes behind the escalation of managed care activity in the 1980s. It is perceived that rapid
cost inflation in Fee-for-Service (FFS) health care in the 1980s renewed customers’ attention in
alternative systems of managed care; see Robinson and Steiner (1988), Glied (2000). Managed
care permitted healthier patients to self select into contracts with fewer goods and lower prices,
while simultaneously shifting risk onto providers who now faced capitated reimbursements. On
the supply side, managed care units responded to new consumer demands and new market op-
portunities, benefiting from cream skimming the healthiest patients (Newhouse, 1984). Perhaps
encouraged by the method in which managed care claimed to control costs while maintain-
ing quality, new federal and state “enabling” laws in the 1980s further spurred the growth in
managed care activity.
Concurrent with the rapid growth in HMOs in the 1980s was a corresponding decrease,
following a fall in the rate of increase, in the national cesarean-section rate. Figure 1 maps
the cesarean and fertility rates from 1980 to 1996. Between 1980 and 1989 cesarean deliveries
rose by over 50 percent, from 16.2 percent of all deliveries to 24.7 percent of the total (NCHS,
1996). Conditional on the fact that cesareans maintained a 40 percent reimbursement premium
over natural deliveries in this period (HIAA, 1996), declining fertility is thought to be one of
the most compelling arguments for the rise in cesareans in this period (see Gruber and Owings,
1996); other explanations for the large increase in cesarean rates include the introduction and
growth of fetal-monitoring (Shiono et. al., 1987) and the threat of malpractice suits (Localio et.
al., 1993). Of interest in this study are the rates after 1989, a period over which cesarean usage
gradually decreased for the first time since its widespread introduction in the early 1960s.
Of the four symptoms that account for over 80 percent of cesareans, there have been de-
clines within diagnosis as well in this period. Traditionally a leading cause of cesareans has
3See, e.g., Frank and Welch (1985), McClaughlin (1988), Tussing and Wojotowycz (1994), McCloskey, Petitti
and Hobel (1992), Baker and Brown (1997), Cutler, McClelland and Newhouse (1997), Feldman and Scharfstein
(1999), Cutler and Reber (2000), Glied (2000).
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been repeat-provider behavior, an observed phenomenon that the likelihood of a cesarean for a
woman previously c-sectioned is extremely high. Repeat cesareans fell from over 9 percent of all
births in 1989 to 7.5 percent in 1996, coincidental with the sudden growth in vaginal births after
cesareans (VBACs) in this time period (CDC, 1998). A second symptom of cesareans is a breech
or abnormal presentation, which largely precludes natural deliveries unless the fetal position is
corrected prior to the second trimester. In 1989, over 90 percent of breech babies were delivered
by cesarean, and this rate had subsequently fallen to 84.7 percent by 1996, although the inci-
dence of breech had remained fairly stable (NCHS, 1996). Other symptoms favoring cesareans
are decidedly subjective diagnoses: fetal distress and non-progressive labor or dystocia, which is
closely related to maternal age and health. Cesareans related to both these symptoms declined
continuously, albeit gradually, after 1989 (NCHS, 1996).
2.2 Mechanisms that link HMO growth with Cesarean Rates
By i) severing the link between mode of delivery and ob/gyn income, ii) selecting cost conserva-
tive providers, and iii) encouraging the use of preventive diagnostic tests (e.g., prenatal tests) to
reduce ex-post costly surgery, managed care radically changed the practice environment facing
ob/gyns aﬃliated with HMOs. In the early 1990s, HMOs also began to impose practice guide-
lines on participating ob/gyns, and some evidence suggests that ob/gyns whose practice patterns
consistently violated such guidelines suﬀered high penalties including the termination of their
contracts; see, e.g., Schauﬄer and Rodriguez (1993), Robinson and Steiner (1998). Standard
theories of induced demand imply that capitated reimbursements for natural and cesarean deliv-
eries would have first order eﬀects on the demand inducing behavior of managed care ob/gyns,
while the periodic utilization reviews would serve to reinforce the eﬀects of this financial scheme.
It follows that as the share of population enrolled in HMOs grew in the late 1980s a larger
fraction of the population was subject to practices favored by HMOs and, in the case of deliveries
it is natural to expect that this would lead to an observed decline in the cesarean rate. An early
indication of this possibility was given in Tussing and Wojotowycz (1992) who reported that
the 1986 cesarean rate in a sample of New York HMOs was 13 percent smaller than that for a
sample of women enrolled in FFS practice. However, there is an immediate problem with such
a direct comparison since omitted health characteristics which may be correlated with enrolling
in an HMO may simultaneously influence the probability of delivering by cesarean section.4
4The selection issue arises because healthier patients, perhaps with unobservable tastes for preventive care, are
reported to enroll more frequently in managed care than in traditional insurance; see Cutler and Reber (1988).
Healthier patients however, are also less likely to undergo a cesarean. Staﬀord (1990), Kizer (1988), McCloskey,
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While cost conservative measures are perhaps the most important determinants of lower
cesarean rates in HMOs, other mechanisms were plausibly at work in depressing non-HMO
cesarean rates in this time period as well. An argument in Phelps (1986) suggests that the
growth in ob/gyn supply since the 1970s may have produced changes in the medical practice,
raised competition and reduced possibilities to induce demand. A related mechanism is the
competition between HMO and FFS providers for the same pool of consumers. Specifically,
increased enrollments in HMOs could force FFS physicians to mimic HMO practices in order to
contract with HMOs and tap into the growing pool of HMO enrollees. In fact, there is indirect
evidence for this hypothesis. A 1996 ACOG report reveals that HMOs became an important
source of customers for FFS ob/gyns, with 80.1 percent of all FFS ob/gyns participating in
salaried managed care positions in 1994, up from 67.2 percent in 1991, even though FFS ob/gyns
earned up to 25 percent higher incomes in 1994.
HMOs might also contribute to decreasing the cesarean rate in non-HMOs by encouraging
the diﬀusion of practices favored by managed care. This line of argument draws from physi-
cian learning models, e.g., Phelps (1992), which suggest that physicians tend to follow the
dominant behavior of other physicians in their local markets, especially when there is profes-
sional uncertainty about the “correct” treatment. One explanation consistent with this observed
phenomenon is that court decisions typically rest on “local patterns of practice” as the norm in
judging malpractice or negligence cases. If such herding indeed takes place, expansions in HMOs
over time would make the practice patterns of HMO physicians dominant, encourage non-HMO
physicians to embrace the practices favored by HMOs and thereby reduce the cesarean rate.
These mechanisms provide a framework in which evidence of a negative statistical relation
between HMO growth and cesarean rates may be given a causal interpretation, which is what we
test for in the empirical section. There are two obvious problems the causality framework faces.
First, it is possible that while HMO market shares may have some true causal eﬀect in decreas-
ing cesarean rates, HMO market shares may be endogenously determined by unobservables that
simultaneously influence cesarean rates. A compelling argument may be that HMOs appear to
locate predominantly in up-county, wealthier areas where unobservable tastes for preventive care
are higher; but, conditional on risk factors, observable health characteristics and demographics,
cesarean rates may also be systematically correlated with such tastes; see Dranove and Wehler
(1994). The regression analysis will control for the possibility of such correlated unobservables
by using a set of seven state laws that regulate HMO operations, to provide instrumental vari-
Petitti and Hobel (1992), Tussing and Wojotowycz (1992, 1994) are examples of some studies modeling the
determinants of cesareans at the individual level without taking account of the endogenous determination of
insurance choice.
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ables estimates of causal eﬀect of HMO market shares on cesarean rates. We will consider the
plausibility of the exogeneity of state laws below.
A second concern is that there is no true causal mechanism that links HMO market shares
with cesarean rates, and it is unobservable contemporaneous changes in tastes for natural de-
liveries rather than the change in health insurance markets that led to the observed decline in
cesareans. Under this scenario the regression analysis will reflect spurious correlations between
HMO market shares and cesareans. I will argue against this hypothesis because to my knowledge
there is no survey or other evidence of such a discrete change in tastes that could independently
account for the large decline in cesareans after 1989 (although it is possible tastes account for
some of the reduction). If the hypothesis is true the regression analysis will not be able to
distinguish between spurious correlation and a causal mechanism for HMO activity. Therefore,
a more reasonable hypothesis for the paper is the following: there are mechanisms that predict a
negative causal relation between the growth in HMOs and a decline in cesarean rates. Empirical
evidence of a negative relation will be consistent with a causal role for HMO market shares.
3 Theory and Related Research
3.1 A Model of Induced Demand, Market Shares and Cesarean Rates
Let an ob/gyn have a utility function of the form
U = U(Y, L, I), UY , UL > 0, UI < 0
where Y represents physician income, L is leisure and I is some normalized level of inducement.
UI < 0 reflects the assumption physicians derive disutility from knowingly inducing demand,
due perhaps to reputation or ethical considerations. This formulation is related to the previous
work of Newhouse (1970), Gruber and Owings (1996) and Dranove (1988), extending it to
accommodate competition among health insurers.
Let m denote managed care and t correspond to traditional insurance by which we will refer
to ob/gyns paid by conventional indemnity insurance. We will use B¯ to denote the stock of
births in the market, and i to represent the probability that an ob/gyn will induce demand for
a cesarean for a given birth or, the “inducement per birth” as in Gruber and Owings (1996);
total inducement, I, is simply B¯i. Denote ζ(i) as the cesarean delivery rate, with ζ 0(·) > 0 and
ζ00(·) = 0.5
Let φ represent the market share of managed care firms (i.e., the fraction of the local popu-
lation that is enrolled in managed care). Then
5Since some fraction of births are appropriately diagnosed as requiring cesarean delivery, we assume ζ(0) > 0.
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Bm = φB¯, Bt = (1− φ)B¯
and for j = m, t
Cj = ζ(i)Bj , N j = (1− ζ(i))Bj
where N represents the total number of natural deliveries and C denotes the total number of
cesarean deliveries. Let L represent the stock of leisure, τn the average time per unit spent on a
natural delivery and τ c the average time per unit on a cesarean delivery with ∆τ = τn− τ c > 0.
The symbols Yn and Yc will respectively denote the ob/gyn reimbursements for a natural and
cesarean delivery respectively with ∆Y = Yc−Yn > 0. It follows that leisure and total physician
payment for child delivery are
Y j = YnN
j + YcC
j, Lj = L− τnN j − τ cCj. (3.1)
Assume utility to be additive. Subject to the constrains in (3.1) ob/gyn of type j (j = m, t)
chooses i to solve
max
i
U j(Y j, Lj , Ij),
yielding the first order condition
U jY (·) [ζ 0(i)∆Y ] + U jL(·)[ζ0(i)(∆τ)] +U jI (·) = 0.
That is, the ob/gyn chooses i∗ to balance the marginal gains in utility from income and leisure
with the marginal disutility from inducement. Noting that ∆Y = 0 for managed care, we see
the immediate implication of capitated payments: at the optimum i∗, there is no income-driven
inducement in managed care. Instead at the optimum, in managed care i∗ solves
UmL (·)[ζ0(i)∆τ ] + UmI (·) = 0.
To facilitate comparisons assume equal market shares. It then follows by UY ,UL > 0 and UI <
0, that
im∗ < i∗t =⇒ ζ(im∗) < ζ(it∗)
or, the optimal cesarean rate is strictly lower for managed care. Define C¯ as the total number
of cesarean births and let c¯ denote the weighted average of the cesarean rates in managed care
and traditional insurance. Then,
c¯ = ζ(im)φ+ ζ(it)(1− φ)
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+ (ζ(im)− ζ(it)) (3.2)
which cannot be signed a priori. As managed share grows (φ increases), the income pressure on
non-managed care ob/gyns increases, so di
t
dφ is plausibly positive and the first term is plausibly




dφ < 0, implying that the sign of the second term will
depend on (ζ 0(im)− ζ0(it)), which cannot be definitively signed.
The third component of this equation is the diﬀerence in the cesarean rate between managed
care and traditional insurance, ζ(im)− ζ(it). Central to this paper is the hypothesis that due to
the absence of pecuniary incentives, threat of dismissal and utilization reviews, cesarean rates
are likely to be lower in managed care relative to traditional insurance. However, this is a
question for empirical analysis. Also, we cannot omit the possibility that ζ(im) − ζ(it) > 0
for some range of φ. For instance, when φ is very low and a very small fraction of births are
covered by managed care it is plausible that managed care ob/gyns oﬀset the decline in utility
from lower total income with more utility from leisure; i.e., by greater inducement. Therefore
equation (3.2) cannot be a priori signed.
Note that holding market shares constant the response of cesarean rates to changes in fertility










which is the basis for previous studies’ examination of changes in cesarean delivery rates to
declining fertility rates.6 Without controlling for contemporaneous changes in managed care
market shares, however, there is no a priori reason to expect the cumulative eﬀect of declining
fertility and increasing managed care market shares to lead to a reduction in cesarean rates;
instead, as equation (3.2) shows this is indeterminate and a question for empirical analysis.
3.2 Related Research
A number of micro-level studies have examined variation in cesarean rates by payor source. Early
research includes Keppel et al (1980) and Goldfarb (1984), who found that self-paying patients
had the lowest rates, patients covered by private insurance had the highest rates, and speculate
that financial incentives underlie these diﬀerences. Managed care was much less prevalent in






< 0 as shown in the Appendix.
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the time-frame of these studies, so there is no direct evidence on diﬀerences in cesarean rates
between managed care and traditional insurance in this body of work.
More recent research has explicitly examined cesarean rate discrepancy in various forms of
managed care (e.g., HMO, IPA, etc.) versus commercial insurance or self pay. These include
Staﬀord’s (1990) study in the California hospital setting, Tussing and Wojotowycz’s (1994) study
of New York city hospitals, and McCloskey, Petitti and Hobel’s (1992) study on a particular
symptom of cesarean (dystocia); see also Kizer (1988). These studies each find a lower prob-
ability of cesarean delivery under managed care versus other forms of insurance in regression
analysis that controls for maternal demographics, hospital characteristics and various symptoms
of cesareans.
However, each of these studies from a fundamental identification problem. Individual deci-
sions to purchase managed care insurance versus purchasing indemnity insurance (or choosing
self pay) may be systematically correlated with unobservable tastes or unobservable health char-
acteristics that simultaneously aﬀect the cesarean probability. In fact, a number of studies have
found that individuals who joined HMOs were in some respect “healthier” than those that chose
conventional insurance; see for e.g., Cutler and Reber (1998), Glied (2000), Cutler and Zeck-
hauser (2000). However, healthier women may be less likely to undergo cesareans. For instance,
unobservable tastes for risky behavior (e.g., disposition for smoking) may raise the likelihood of
fetal or maternal distress that are strong determinants of cesareans. Relatedly, numerous studies
attribute the higher cesarean rates amongst Hispanic and Black women to the risk factors or
poorer health characteristics associated with their lower socioeconomic status; see, e.g., Placek
and Taﬀel (1990) and Tussing and Wojotowycz (1992). While we will control for a number of
observable determinants of health, if there is systematic correlation between unobservables that
aﬀect both the likelihood of cesareans as well as HMO enrollments, then variations in HMO
market shares cannot identify changes in cesarean rates.
This type of self selection has been long noted in the literature examining cesarean probabili-
ties by payor source (see, e.g., Kizer (1988), Staﬀord (1990), McCloskey et al (1992), Tussing and
Wojotowycz (1994)), but has gone unaddressed in empirical analysis. In their well known work
Gruber and Owings (1996) use exogenous changes in fertility to identify the induced demand for
cesarean rates; however, diﬀerences in managed care versus traditional indemnity is not studied
in that work. Barring random assignment of women to insurance type, identification of the
causal role of HMO market shares will depend on exclusion restrictions that aﬀect the growth of
HMOmarket shares but do not independently aﬀect cesarean rates. Some studies have suggested
using the average number of workers in the area as a predictor of HMO growth that may not
independently aﬀect health outcomes (see Baker and Browning (1999) for an example from the
12
breast cancer literature; Mitchell and Cromwell (1986) for a similar instrument). However, as
suggested in Dranove and Wehler (1994), such instruments may be correlated with both tastes
for surgery and underlying determinants of health that in turn aﬀect cesarean probabilities.
Therefore, in this paper the identifying variation will be obtained from a number of state
laws that foster or discourage HMO entry, operation and growth. There are at least 24 well
defined state regulatory laws that govern the operation of HMOs (HCFA, 1996). Some of these,
e.g., capital or reserve requirements, enumeration of basic benefits, prohibitions against decep-
tive advertising, provision of grievance mechanisms and utilization reviews are uniform across
all states and not a source of variation. Of the remaining, there are seven regulations that are
plausibly important in HMO locating and expansion decisions, that vary quite widely across
states. These include laws that mandate consumer representatives on HMO boards, policymak-
ing roles for subscribers, annual relicensing to operate HMOs and external peer review, each of
which plausibly discourage HMO entry or growth; and, laws that might be perceived as encour-
aging HMO growth, e.g., mandating public and private employers (typically with a minimum
number of employees) to oﬀer an HMO option, and accommodation of the Federal HMO law
which overrides specific state laws that limit the operations of HMOs.
This source of identifying variation will be suﬃcient to estimate the causal eﬀect of HMO
market share on cesarean rates if unobserved variables that aﬀect the growth in HMOs do
not themselves influence the passage of laws or their stringency. Concerns that state laws
governing the operation of HMOs emerged as a response to the size or past behavior of HMOs
will be alleviated by noting that most of the laws used in this paper were enacted in the late
1970s and early 1980s,7 substantially preceding the 1991-1992 time period studied in this paper
and substantially preceding the dramatic growth in managed care activity. A more thorough
discussion of the exclusion restrictions and their regional distributions is given in the next section.
In addition the regression analysis will give statistical over-identification tests to empirically
verify the exogeneity assumptions.
4 Data and Empirical Analysis
The study is facilitated by a 1989 federal law that requires every birthing center to record
the mode of delivery on the birth certificate. These data come from the NCHS which also
documents detailed parental, hospital and other birth characteristics of each of the more than
4 million babies born in 1991-1992 in the United States. These data are merged with HMO
7One exception is the state dual choice requirement which was introduced in 1973, but underwent substantial
amendments in 1985.
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market share data from the AAHP for 1991-1992, years in which 99.7 percent of babies were
born in a birthing center.
We focus on this time period for two reasons. First, the post-1992 market share data available
to this paper were very noisy. Second, as noted before, a variety of structures (e.g., IPAs,
PPOs, POS) emerged after the early 1990s blurring the distinction between managed care and
traditional indemnity while “HMO” in the early 1990s was a fairly homogeneous and well defined
organization. The HMO and NCHS data are merged with county characteristics from the
County Business Patterns (CBP), state health regulatory laws from the Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA) and health care facilities from the Area Resource Files (ARF).
The most important drawback of the data is that payor source cannot be identified by birth.
Instead, we have measures of HMO enrollment by zip code which are aggregated by counties to
compute HMO market shares, measuring the fraction of a local market’s (insured) population
that is enrolled in the HMO. Counties are used to approximate local markets, since deliveries
are not a specialized service for which patients travel far for treatment.8 HMO data collected by
the AAHP are reported only for those zip codes with population size greater than 100,000; this
pares the data set to a sample of approximately 400 counties per year. The empirical strategy
is to use HMO county market shares rate as indicative of the likelihood that a delivery in that
county is covered by an HMO. In keeping with the aggregation of the HMO variable, individual
level data from the NCHS are aggregated up to the county level and converted to rates using
population data from the NCHS and ARF. With the exception of state regulatory laws all data
are at the county level.
Summary statistics are presented in Table 2a. Some striking patterns of HMO activity
and cesarean rates emerge from studying the data: nationwide southern states have the lowest
HMO market shares and the highest cesarean rates, while western states have the highest HMO
activity and the lowest cesarean rates. Of course causality cannot be immediately inferred from
these sample statistics since the southern states also have disproportionately larger fractions of
women with higher predispositions for cesareans (for example black women, women on AFDC
and women in poverty).9 In the data although aggregate cesarean rates fell between 1991 and
1992, there was substantial underlying heterogeneity across counties. In particular cesarean
8Some researchers choose to use Health Care Service Areas (HCSAs), which are larger areas such as groups
of counties, to approximate the relevant market (e.g., Makuc et al (1991)). However, HCSAs are not precisely
defined, and further, while HCSAs may be superior measures for those services which are less commonly available
in every county (such as MRI scans), they may be less relevant for deliveries.
9Black women are poorer on average and are less likely to be insured (US Census Bureau 1996), limiting their
access to prenatal care, raising the likelihood of poorer maternal health, and thereby raising the likelihood of a
cesarean (NCHS, 1994).
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rates also rose in approximately 100 counties, although the mean increase in these counties was
only .016 percentage points.
Analogously, although the mean HMO market share rose between 1991 and 1992 there is
substantial variation in managed care activity across counties. Several local markets exhibit
a zero percent HMO market share in both years, and HMO activity actually decreased in 74
counties between 1991 and 1992. Part of the unequal distribution in HMO activity emerges
because HMOs appear to prefer locating in wealthier, predominantly white-collar regions with
well developed medical infrastructures where their clientele base will be larger; see Baker and
Brown (1999). In the sample studied here, the mean HMO market share in the above-average-
income markets is 20.1 percent, while it is only 11.7 percent in markets with below-average
income.
As described above, this paper uses variations in seven state laws that regulate the growth
and performance of managed care institutions to estimate the casual eﬀects of HMO growth on
cesarean rates. Each of these variables is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if a particular
law is in place (in 1991-1992), and zero otherwise. Descriptive information of these exclusion
variables is given in Table 2b.
There are some broad patterns that we can draw from the distribution of laws. On average
it appears that the regulatory environment in the northeastern states is conducive to managed
care activity (e.g., by mandating Dual Choice, accommodation of Federal HMO, and providing
the HMO alternative), discouraging laws that inhibit the growth in managed care (e.g., annual
relicensing, external reviews); the regulatory environment in southern states may be perceived
as being the least conducive to managed care growth. On average, it appears that the western
and northcentral states lie between these regions in the stringency of laws regulating managed
care. However, as shown in Table 2b, these are only broad patterns. For example, northeastern
states are also likely to require a policy role for subscribers and require a consumer representative
on board which could both be perceived as enforcing higher standards of care and may aﬀect
HMO entry decisions on the margin; these laws are less prevalent in southern states. It is
possible, however, that these latter quality assurance measures are less important in HMO
locating decisions relative to some of the other regulatory measures listed in Table 2b.
What drove the diﬀerences in the adoption or stringency of these regulatory laws across
the states? There is little theoretical or empirical research on this question. Glied (2000)
argues that despite an early hostile regulatory environment, federal and state laws in the early
1980s may have been spurred by the dramatic growth in health care costs and the methods
in which managed care sought to address to many of the market failures in health insurance:
e.g., moral hazard on the part of both consumers and physicians, and asymmetric information
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between patient and physician. One might speculate that diﬀerences in regulatory history,
consumer activism and recognition of the possible benefits of managed care led to variations in
the regulations that evolved across regions. We will not explore the causes behind the escalation
of managed care activity or its variations across regions, but take them as exogenous to the
growth in HMO market shares. Critical to the empirical strategy is our belief that the laws that
aﬀect managed care growth and enrollments are uncorrelated with the unobservables that aﬀect
the disposition for cesareans.
4.1 Empirical Methodology
There are two principal issues that empirical analysis will address. First is the plausible endo-
geneity of the measure of HMO market shares. Second, as the comparative statics results of
Section 3 suggest a possibly nonlinear eﬀect on HMO market shares we will estimate both linear
and nonlinear regression models. To this end, the causal eﬀect of the growth in HMO market
shares on cesarean rates will be empirically estimated by variants of the model:






iβ4 + εit (4.1)
where CRate is the cesarean section rate in county i and year t,HMO is the HMO market share,
Fert is the county fertility rate, x is a vector of demographic characteristics including variables
relating to race, age, education, income, number of hospital beds per capita, z is a vector of
severity variables including previous cesarean, birthweight, fetal distress, maternal distress and
µ consists of a full set of state fixed eﬀects.
We will consider two specifications for the function f(HMOit), given by10
Specification 1 : f(HMOit) = HMOitδ1
Specification 2 : f(HMOit) = HMOitδ1 +HMO2itδ2.
If HMO market shares were exogenously determined, then estimation of the model in equa-
tion (4.1) would lead to correct causal inference for the eﬀect of HMO growth on cesarean rates.
However, as described above we are concerned with the endogenous determination of HMO mar-
ket shares. To address this issue we use instrumental variables (IV) methods to identify and
estimate the causal eﬀect of HMO market shares on cesarean rates. For the linear model in
10We have also estimated other flexible estimation methods including a semiparametric method in Newey, Powell
and Vella (1999); those results are a part of the original version of this paper entitled “Organization of Health
Care Markets and the Delivery Choice: Semiparametric Estimates” which may be requested from the author. The
more flexible methods yield some diﬀerences in point estimates at the tails and are much less precisely estimated
due to the high degree of multicollinearity present in such semiparametric regression models.
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Specification 1, we will use two stage least squares (2SLS), while for Specification 2 we will use
nonlinear IV (NLIV) methods. In both cases, we will generate the instruments by estimation of
the reduced form:
HMOit = c+ Laws
0






iπ4 + vit (4.2)
where Laws is the vector of seven state laws described in Table 2b. For NLIV, we will use
the predicted value dHMOit and its square dHMO2it as the instruments. As is well known from
Hausman (1983), in the nonlinear case, 2SLS estimates using the predicted values of the variables
in place in the endogenous variables leads to biased and inconsistent estimates of the parameters.
Therefore, we will replace 2SLS with NLIV methods for the nonlinear models.
The remaining variables in equation (4.1) are characteristics that are expected to explain
some of the variation in cesarean rates. Following Gruber and Owings (1996), exogenous de-
creases in the fertility rate should increase the income pressure on ob/gyns and raise the cesarean
rate. Numerous studies have found that specific characteristics such as older mothers, very young
mothers, Black, less educated, unmarried (e.g., McCloskey et al (1992), Tussing and Wojotowycz
(1992, 1994)), raise the probability of a cesarean, so we control for each of these features. All
regressions control for the per capita income of the county, and symptoms of cesareans by in-
cluding the previous cesarean rate, low and high birthweight rate. In addition, some regressions
control for female labor supply, fetal distress rate, the breech presentation rate and the maternal
distress rate. We also control for size of the county hospital by using the average number of
beds per capita, and control for economic shocks across the two years with a year dummy. To
mitigate the possibility that the results reflect fixed diﬀerences across states, we also use a full
set of state fixed eﬀects.
4.2 Results
Table 3 reports ordinary least squares (OLS) and IV results from estimation of equation (4.1),
also giving the reduced form results. We first discuss the linear results. In column (1), consistent
with our priors we find a small negative relation between HMO market share and the cesarean
rates. However, our primary concern is that these estimates are biased due to the possible
endogeneity of HMO market shares. Correcting for the endogeneity via two-stage least squares
in column (2) increases the HMO coeﬃcient in absolute value almost tenfold to -.126, which is
statistically diﬀerent from zero. Inflation of the HMO coeﬃcient is suggestive of unobservables
that are positively correlated with both cesarean rates and HMO market shares. Our first set
of results indicate that a .1 percentage point increase in HMO market shares is associated with
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a .0126 percentage point decrease in cesarean rates. At 1991 cesarean rates, this is equivalent
to a 5.4 percent reduction in cesarean rates.
We find in column (2) that our controls for the percentage of deliveries in a county that are
high birthweight (weighing more than 4500 grams at birth), low birthweight (weighing less than
2500 grams at birth) and previous delivery each bear the expected positive sign and are each
significant. Also, consistent with Gruber and Owings’ hypothesis, the coeﬃcient on fertility is
negative and significant supporting the supposition that, conditional on managed care growth,
decreases in fertility led to induced demand for cesareans. Relative to the left-out category
(Age < 20) the cesarean rates are statistically equivalent for mothers between 20-35 years, but
higher for mothers that are 35 years or older. Relative to Hispanics (the left-out group), as
the percentage of Black mothers increases so does the cesarean rate, but there is no statistical
diﬀerence for White mothers.
Many of the instrumental variables in column (4) bear the expected sign, and are statistically
significant at the .05 error level. For instance, the presence of dual choice and accommodation
of the Federal HMO law in a state are positively correlated with HMO market shares, while
mandating policy roles for subscribers and open enrollment have a negative correlation with
HMO market shares. Mandating employers to provide an HMO alternative is of an unexpected
sign, but insignificant. Contrary to our priors, laws that require a consumer representative on
HMO boards has a positive coeﬃcient and is significant. One explanation for this result is that
this variable may not itself represent a substantive barrier to managed care growth, and may be
absorbing the eﬀects of other unobservable factors that are conducive to HMO operations.11
The reduced form has a fairly high adjusted R-squared, and the F-test rejects the joint
insignificance of all parameter estimates at the .01 error level. To determine the validity of the
instrumental variables, a test of over-identification was implemented for the TSLS regression.
The χ2(6) statistic of the reduced form regression in column (4) is estimated to be 17.90. Thus,
the test of over-identifying restriction rejects the null hypothesis of the joint invalidity of the
exclusion restrictions used in estimation, at the .05 percent error level.
The results in column (2) support the basic contention of this paper: by severing the link
between income and mode of delivery, encouraging preventive care and promoting cost conser-
vative measures, the growth in HMO market shares results in reducing the national cesarean
rates. The empirical results find that the strong, negative and statistically significant relation-
ship between the percent of insured population in HMOs and cesarean rates persists despite
controls for hospital size, region, income, demographics and risk factors associated with higher
11For instance, it is apparent from Table 2b that states which are more likely to mandate consumer represen-
tation are also the states whose regulatory environment is otherwise most conducive for managed care growth.
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cesarean rates. Before we consider alternative hypotheses that could produce these results, we
examine the robustness of the estimates to a change in specification.
Column (3) gives nonlinear IV estimates of equation (4.1) using a quadratic in HMO market
shares. Although the choice of a quadratic seems somewhat arbitrary, we have found that the
inclusion of higher powers leads to substantively small diﬀerences in the results.12 Using the
reduced form results from column (4), we now use the predicted value of HMO as well as its
square as instrumental variables. In column (3) we find that although the NLIV estimate of the
linear term is barely significant at the .1 error level, the quadratic is highly significant. The point
estimates on the remaining variables are fairly unchanged in value and precision. Evaluating at
the sample market share mean of .154, the implied NLIV eﬀect for a .1 percentage point increase
in HMO market shares is a .0108 percentage point reduction in cesarean rates. Comparing this
result with that obtained in column (2) indicates that ignoring possible nonlinearities somewhat
overstates the true HMO eﬀect on cesareans.13 In a test for examining the validity of the
over-identifying restrictions it was found that the χ2(5) statistic for the NLIV regression was
slightly lower than for the TSLS regression; it was estimated to be 16.70. This rejects the null
hypothesis of the non-exogeneity of the joint invalidity of the exclusion restrictions used for the
NLIV regression at the .05 error level.
What do the estimates imply? Between 1991 and 1992 the national cesarean rate fell .05
percentage points from .221 to .216, while average HMO market shares rose .083 percentage
points. Holding other variables fixed and using the conservative estimate in Table 3, this im-
plies that the growth in managed care activity can explain only .0149 (or 29.8 percent) of the
contemporaneous reduction in cesarean rates. The number of cesarean births declined by 16455
between 1991 and 1992 (CDC, 1998). Using HIAA (1991) estimates that the average cesarean
cost $3106 more than the average natural childbirth in 1991, the net savings from births that
were delivered naturally in lieu of a cesarean is approximately $51 million; of this approximately
$15 million can be attributed to the growth in managed care. Although this numeric is a small
fraction of total health care costs, it must be noted that this estimate does not take into account
other costs such as the longer post-delivery hospital stays and neo-natal intensive care that are
associated with cesarean deliveries (Marieskind, 1979).
12We have also implemented semilinear and semiparametric methods which are found to yield small diﬀerences
in the results and a greater amount of imprecision, especially in the tails of the data.
13We can also use the NLIV estimates to evaluate varying marginal eﬀects at diﬀerent market share levels. For
example, the implied marginal eﬀect on cesarean rates for a .1 percentage point increase in market shares is .0174,
when evaluated at the western average market share. However, the standard errors are correspondingly higher
when the estimates are evaluted at this level.
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4.3 Alternative Models
We next consider whether the obtained results are logically consistent with alternate explana-
tions than the ones we have oﬀered, examine their robustness to alternate specifications and
examine the eﬀects of HMO market shares on outcomes other than the aggregate cesarean rate.
An immediate concern is that regions of low managed care market share (and therefore high
traditional indemnity insurance market shares) are regions in which ob/gyns are more likely
to diagnose risk factors such as maternal distress, fetal distress and dystocia that are strong
predictors of cesarean rates; see e.g. Tussing andWojotowycz (1992). This is a standard induced-
demand hypothesis in which ob/gyns who have pecuniary incentives for cesarean delivery justify
their choice by subjectively labelling births as being high-risk. Evidence that ob/gyns may be
engaging in this practice is given in McCloskey, Petitti and Hobel (1992), and evidence of this
type of excessive coding more generally in the Medicare program is given in Carter, Newhouse
and Relles (1990).
While the empirical results have controlled for a variety of risk factors such as age, previous
cesarean, low birthweight, high birthweight and race, we address this potential problem by in-
cluding additional controls for the percent of mothers in county i and year t whose deliveries were
labelled as maternal distress, fetal distress or breech presentation. Results from re-estimating
the linear two-stage least squares and nonlinear IV estimates are given in Table 4, omitting
results for all but the coeﬃcients of interest.
We find that these additional controls do not qualitatively change the results we obtained
previously. In the linear model the coeﬃcient on HMO in column (1) remains statistically
significant, and the point-estimate is almost unchanged from Table 3. We find that the NLIV-
implied estimates in column (2) attenuate relative to the previous results. Specifically, for a .1
percentage point increase in HMOmarket shares the NLIV results now indicate a .096 percentage
point decline in cesarean rates. While all three risk factors bear the positive coeﬃcient, in
both columns the coeﬃcient on fetal distress is statistically insignificant at conventional levels.
Although this result implies that an increase in the riskiness of births via fetal distress has
no eﬀect on cesarean rates, we suggest an alternate interpretation: it is very likely that fetal
distress is strongly correlated with other risk factors such as low birthweight, high birthweight
and possibly maternal distress, so that once these other symptoms have been controlled for it is
possible there remains no statistically discernible independent eﬀect of fetal distress.14
14Previous studies have found fetal distress to have a positive coeﬃcient on the cesarean probability despite
controls for maternal distress, low birthweight and breech; e.g., Tussing and Wojotowycz (1992) and Gruber and
Owings (1996). These studies use data on individuals. It is possible that the aggregation of individual data to
county rates removes a lot of variation that leads to the result found here.
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A second and related concern is that our results could be reflecting regional variations in
demands for cesareans arising from variations in female labor force attachment. This will aﬀect
our estimates if labor force attachment rates are systematically correlated with the level of
managed care activity, and independently aﬀect cesarean probabilities. While there is some
evidence that labor force participation is correlated with the reduction in fertility (Olsen (1994)),
there is no clear a priori correlation between tastes for cesareans and labor force attachment:
although cesareans may reduce the uncertainty in the timing of deliveries, the average post-
operation recovery period for cesareans is longer; Placek and Taﬀel (1980). Similarly, one may
speculate that labor force attachment rates are positively correlated with managed care activity
(e.g., HMOs may infer a large pool of prospective consumers when the county labor participation
rate is larger), although there is little empirical research on this question.15 In either of these
cases, ignoring variations in labor force attachment will lead to omitted variables bias in our
estimates.
We use data on state labor force attachment from the Area Resource Files (ARF) to examine
this hypothesis and report the results in Table 5. Inclusion of the labor force participation
rate attenuates the HMO eﬀect. We find that in the linear specification of column (1) the
coeﬃcient on HMOmarket share declines in absolute value to -.099, but is less precisely estimated
than the previous regression models. The NLIV estimates similarly decline, implying a .088
percentage point reduction in cesarean rates for a .1 point rise in market shares. The coeﬃcient
on labor force participation itself is negative and highly significant implying that conditional
on income, demographics and other risk factors, the incidence of cesareans is declining in labor
force participation rates. The inclusion of the labor force variable has no large eﬀects on most
other variables, except on fertility whose coeﬃcients attenuate significantly in both columns (1)
and (2).16
It is instructive to consider whether this result is a function of other omitted characteristics
that are correlated with labor force participation. Suppose women in the labor force are more
likely to be insured than women out of the labor force. Then, because the uninsured are generally
of poorer health (Kasper, 1986), one would expect the labor force participation rate to have a
negative correlation with conditions symptomatic of poorer health, e.g., maternal and fetal
distress. This would overstate the true causal eﬀect of labor force participation rates on the
cesarean rate because such risk factors are excluded from columns (1)-(2) Alternatively, labor
force attachment (and delayed childbearing) may be positively correlated with such risk factors
15The sample correlation between HMO market shares and the female labor force attachment is .3007.
16This last result is suggestive (but not conclusive) of a positive correlation between fertility and female labor
force attachment, which is contrary to our priors.
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in which case our results may be understating the true eﬀect. In columns (3)-(4) of Table 5
we append the previous regression with controls for risk factors. Inclusion of these additional
controls reduces both the eﬀects of labor force participation, as well as the estimated HMO eﬀect
on cesarean rates. The attenuation implies that the cesarean rate reduction associated with a
.1 percentage point increase in HMO market shares is now .0094 and .008 in columns (3) and
(4) respectively, evaluating NLIV at the sample mean.
In column (5) we test another hypothesis based on an assumption that there is some fraction
of deliveries in the population that is correctly diagnosed as requiring cesareans. If managed care
is driving down the cesarean rate it is natural to expect that they are doing so by first shifting
those cesareans that are purely due to induced-demand rather than those that are medically
necessary. One implication is that if past expansions in managed care have already reduced
the cesarean rate, further increases in managed care penetration may have progressively smaller
eﬀects in doing so. Therefore, if a marginal increase in HMO market share does in fact have
a causal role in reducing the cesarean rate, this eﬀect should be greatest where HMO market
share is smallest and be substantially reduced where HMO market share is already large.
We test this hypothesis by introducing an interaction between HMO market shares and an
indicator for market shares that are greater than the median HMO market share17:
CRateit = α+HMOitβ0 + (Medianit ∗HMOit)β1 + Fertitβ2 + x0itβ3 + z0itβ4 + µ0iβ5 + εit
where Medianit is a binary indicator that takes the value 1 if the market share in county i in
year t is greater than the median market share in the data and 0 otherwise.
If this hypothesis is correct, then HMO market share coeﬃcient β0 should remain negative
while β1 should be positive. Using instruments for both the interaction variable and HMO
market share variable,18 our results in column (5) do not give support to this hypothesis at
conventional significance levels: β1 is positive, but it is statistically significant at less than the
70 percent confidence level. Although any inference based on these estimates will be imprecise
we note, with this caveat, that these estimates imply that for a .1 percentage point increase in
HMO market shares the generic reduction in the cesarean rate is .0101 percentage points; but
for regions with greater than median managed care activity the reduction is slightly less at .009.
In results not reported here we have also estimated this model using breakpoints other than
the median market shares; this change does not produce results that are more supportive of the
hypothesis.
17The median HMO market share is .135. Using the median rather than the mean makes the estimates less
influenced by outliers.
18A separate reduced form is estimated using the interaction as the dependent variable.
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A question of interest is whether the HMO eﬀect on the cesarean rate is working through its
eﬀect on primary cesareans (cesareans on first births), repeat cesareans, or both.19 There is sub-
stantial empirical evidence that the probability of a cesarean conditional on a previous cesarean
delivery is tremendously high; e.g., Marieskind (1979), Tussing and Wojotowycz (1992). Eval-
uating whether reductions in the aggregate cesarean rate are due to reductions in the primary
or repeat cesarean rates can be instructive in understanding the mechanisms through which
managed care insurance results in lowering the cesarean rate.
Despite historically high rates, primary cesareans declined appreciably from more than 16
percent in 1989 to 15.1 percent in 1992, while the contemporaneous reduction in repeat cesarean
rates was smaller: from 8.5 percent to 8.2 percent (CDC, 1998). The growth in managed care
could in principle lead to reductions in both these rates. If a large fraction of primary cesareans
were due to induced demand, then the rise in HMO practices and the absence of pecuniary
incentives for HMO ob/gyns should directly result in a reduction of the primary cesarean rate.
In fact, Gruber and Owings (1996) find that up to 32 percent of primary cesareans may have been
the result of induced demand. While ob/gyns have traditionally defended repeat cesareans on
medical grounds, recent evidence has shown that VBAC rates in HMOs have risen more sharply
than those in traditional insurance; e.g. Staﬀord (1991), PHC (1995). Thus it is possible that
there exists a statistical association between managed care activity and the reduction in each of
these rates. To assess this hypothesis we estimate the regression models with the repeat cesarean
rate and primary cesarean rate as dependent variables, and give the results in Table 6.20
We find that while increases in HMO enrollments have a strong negative association with the
primary cesarean rate given in column (1), its relationship with the repeat cesarean rate given
in column (3) is statistically indiscernible from zero. In fact, although the F-statistic in column
(3) rejects the joint insignificance of all the coeﬃcients at the .05 error level, it is still fairly low.
These findings are echoed by the NLIV estimates for repeat cesareans in columns (2) and (4).
For all columns, the risk factors are found to be positively associated with both primary and
repeat cesareans, but appear to have a stronger eﬀect on primary cesareans. Interestingly, we
find that the inducement eﬀect for fertility is substantially higher for primary than for repeat
19The cesarean rate is the sum of primary and repeat cesarean rates. Conditional on having a previous cesarean,
if a birth is not repeat cesarean then it is a VBAC. The primary (repeat) cesarean rates are measures as the number
of primary (repeat) cesareans normalized by the total number of births in a county.
20We note here the relation between “Previous Cesarean” and “Repeat Cesarean”. At the individual level,
all individuals that are classified as having repeat cesareans must have had a previous cesarean (by definition).
However, having had a previous cesarean does not necessarily imply that the individual has a repeat cesarean;
the individual may have a VBAC. Therefore, repeat and previous cesarean are not perfectly collinear.
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cesareans. For primary cesareans, our linear and nonlinear results indicate that a .1 percentage
point increase in HMO market shares is associated with between .0082 and .009 percentage
points reduction in primary cesarean rates. The absence of evidence linking managed care with
repeat cesarean rates suggests that perhaps due to the medical uncertainty surrounding the
success of VBACs in this time period (see ACOG, 1996), HMOs played a role in reducing the
aggregate cesarean rate largely by reducing the number of first-time cesareans.
Finally we consider, as in Gruber and Owings (1996), whether there are asymmetric responses
in cesarean rates to increases versus declines in managed care penetration. It is plausible that
once managed care has grown and managed care practice patterns have evolved as the “norm”,
exogenous declines in managed care market shares have little eﬀect on raising the cesarean rates.
A candidate explanation for this pattern would be that malpractice laws typically evaluate
the appropriateness of a procedure based on local standards of practice; see Phelps (1992).
Therefore, if past expansions in managed care have led natural childbirth to be the dominant
practice pattern, ob/gyns in traditional insurance may have reduced incentives to induce demand
for cesareans due to the threat of malpractice. Consequently, future exogenous declines in
managed care penetration may have a negligible eﬀect on raising cesarean rates.
To test this hypothesis we construct an indicator variable (“Decline”) which takes the value 1
for the 74 counties in which HMO market shares declined from 1991 to 1992. We then construct
the interaction of this variable with HMO market share, and estimate regressions of the form:





iβ6 + εit .
The coeﬃcient β2 is a measure of the diﬀerential eﬀect on cesarean rates due to declines in HMO
market share. The results are given in Table 7.
If the cesarean rate responds symmetrically to rises and declines in HMO market shares,
then β0 should unchanged from a regression without the Decline and interaction variables, and
β2 should be zero. We find no evidence of asymmetric responses in regressions with and without
controls for female labor force attachment, as the coeﬃcient β2 is statistically indistinguishable
from zero. However, we find a positive discrete eﬀect on cesarean rates in counties where
managed care activity fell (β1 > 0).
These results give evidence of symmetric responses in cesarean rates to increases and declines
in managed care activity. One explanation for this result is that the growth in managed care
until 1992 may have been too recent a phenomenon for its practice patterns to have evolved as
the “local standard of care”. In this case, in the event of exogenous declines in managed care
activity ob/gyns in traditional insurance may continue to respond as before to the fee diﬀerential
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between vaginal and cesarean deliveries. Then, because the observed cesarean rate is the sum
of rates in managed care and traditional insurance exogenous decline in managed care will be
associated with an observed rise in cesarean rates.
4.4 Quality of births
The previous section examined the short run eﬀects of HMO growth on cesarean rates. This
section focuses on whether, conditional on cesarean rates, increased HMO activity impacts the
quality of births. Numerous studies have documented diﬀerential quality in service between
traditional fee-for-service and managed care systems; e.g., Cutler, McClellan and Newhouse
(1997), Feldman and Scharfstein (1999), McLaughlin (1988). This section focuses on three
specific measures of quality: neo-natal infant mortality rates, birth injury/complications and
Apgar scores.
The regression results above have shown that increased HMO activity is correlated with
shifting births from cesareans to natural deliveries. Although the absence of pecuniary incentives
in managed care may be the primary reason for the decline in cesarean rates, some fraction of
this decline may also be attributed to the increased pressure to maintain lower costs in managed
care. There is anecdotal evidence, for example, that HMO physicians face substantial pressure
(including threat of dismissal) to follow practice patterns established by the HMO and reduce
costs by choosing lower-reimbursed alternatives; see Robinson and Steiner (1998).
It is possible therefore that at the margin an HMO ob/gyn may have increased incentives
to perform a natural delivery.21 It could be argued that the higher rates of VBACs in HMOs
(Staﬀord, 1991) is indicative of this phenomenon. However, since performing a natural delivery
when a cesarean is medically necessary could result in delivery injuries/complications including
infant mortality, HMO market shares may be correlated with an increase in observed delivery
injuries/complications or neo-natal infant mortality rates. Alternatively, the NCHS has found
that by actively encouraging prenatal care pre-existing conditions may be better detected under
managed care, reducing the likelihood of complications at birth. A 1996 CDC study on 1990
births found that fetal mortality was four times higher for mothers who had no exposure to
prenatal care,22 which would indicate a negative correlation between HMO market shares and
neo-natal infant mortality.
21For example for the marginal delivery if there is some indication but no strong, compelling factors suggesting
a cesarean, it is conceivable that an HMO ob/gyn chooses natural delivery.
22The study also indicates that access to prenatal care is greatly higher for educated, White mothers. One
example of managed care prenatal intervention that could result in lowered cesarean rates is the repositioning of
breech positions, prior to the first trimester. Another is the detection of pre-existing conditions.
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To test these hypotheses, we estimate instrumental regressions of the form:





where Qit is alternatively the birth injury/complication rate, neo-natal infant mortality rate and
percentage of low Apgar scores in county i at year t.23 By focussing on quality measures that
are typically observed after the decision to perform a cesarean has been made, we mitigate any
concerns for reverse causality.
We use the six hour neo-natal infant mortality rate since this, rather than a 28-day rate,
is more likely to be directly related to the delivery. We control for the county cesarean rate
because cesareans result in roughly twice the blood loss as natural deliveries and anesthesia is
more frequently administered for cesareans, each of which could raise the likelihood of birth
injuries/complications (CDC, 1995). Also, injuries from surgical procedures are more commonly
reported for cesarean deliveries. As both fetal deaths and Apgar scores are plausibly correlated
with the number and degree of birth injuries, we include birth injury rates as a regressor in
the infant mortality and Apgar rate regressions. Apgar rate data were available for only 199
counties, so we use three region dummies in place of the state fixed eﬀects for that regression.
Regression results are given in Table 7. Before discussing the results note that in the birth
injury/complication and Apgar rate regressions (columns (2)-(3)) although the F-statistics reject
the null hypothesis that all the coeﬃcients are jointly zero at the 95 percent level, the very
low pseudo R-squared indicates that the chosen regressors explain very little of the dependent
variable variation over this time period. While we discuss the results, we caution against placing
any strong emphasis on them because of the fairly weak power of the regressors in explaining
the dependent variables’ variation.
We find that the coeﬃcient on HMO market shares is statistically insignificant in all but
the birth injury/complication rate (where it is significant at the .1 error level), suggesting that
in the 1991-1992 period the growth in HMOs was not associated with tandem declines in these
quality measures. Similarly, once various risk factors have been controlled for the cesarean rate
has no statistical eﬀect on either the injury rate or Apgar rate; however it has a small but
statistically negative association with the neo-natal infant mortality rate. While there is some
informal notion that cesareans are more likely to results in infant deaths (see, e.g., Cox and
Schwartz , 1990), this observation could simply be a result of the induced correlation between
low birthweight and cesarean rates. That is, low birthweight babies are both more likely to be
23We use the Apgar score measured at 5 minutes after birth, which reflect conditions of heart rate, respiration,
muscle tone, reflex, irritability and color, and are utilized in predicting a newborn’s probability of survival (NCHS,
1994). An Apgar score can range from 1 (poor health) to 10 (good health); the low Apgar score rate is the
percentage of babies with scores under 7.
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delivered cesarean and more likely to die; see CDC (1998). Thus, once low birthweight has been
controlled for it is statistically possible for cesareans to be positively associated with neo-natal
infant mortality rates. As expected, risk factors such as low weight, breech, maternal distress
and fetal distress have large positive eﬀects on both the birth injury rate and the neo-natal infant
mortality rate. In addition, in the neo-natal infant mortality rate regression, the coeﬃcient on
birth injury/rate is found to be positive and statistically significant at the .05 error level.
In summary, our results give some support for the hypothesis that the initial growth in man-
aged care is not associated with declines in certain qualitative measures of deliveries in this time
period. Since the mid 1990s, the popular press has questioned the propriety of VBACs and raised
concerns that the cost pressure on HMOs has led to a rise in birthing injuries through VBACs.24
More recently, Frigoletto et al (1999) have criticized government initiatives in promoting VBACs
and found systematic evidence that by 1995 birth injuries were often tied to vaginal labor in
cases where, in previous years, ob/gyns would have opted for a cesarean.25 Thus, whether the
continued rise in managed care over the 1990s led to any change in the patterns found in this
section, is an important question for future research.
5 Conclusions
A standard theory of induced demand makes salient predictions about delivery choices when
ob/gyns are confronted with an exogenous adverse shock to their income: ob/gyns will shift
deliveries away from natural childbirths to the more highly reimbursed alternative, cesarean
delivery. Equivalently, the exogenous reduction in fertility in 1989-1996 should have been coin-
cidental with a rise in cesarean rates, but the raw data indicate otherwise. This paper reconciles
this apparent contradiction of the induced model by examining the contemporaneous growth in
managed care activity. Managed care severs the link between obstetrics’ delivery choices and
financial reimbursement, eliminating one of the principal incentives in induced demand for ce-
sareans. Thus, the dramatic increase in managed care activity in the early 1990s should exact an
eﬀect opposite from that of declining fertility on cesarean rates. This paper examines whether
the data are consistent with this hypothesis.
We find no contradiction of the induced demand model. The evidence shows that declining
fertility was associated with an increase in the cesarean rate, but that this eﬀect was negated
by a reverse eﬀect from growing managed care activity that led to the observed reduction
24See, e.g., Korte (1998); and, “Hospital, HMOs shouldn’t dictate birthing options”, from The Hampton Union,
2001. (Available at www.seacoastonline.com/news/hampton/h10_23_e1.htm)
25Besides the obvious risks for patients, these authors pointedly note that reverting to a cesarean after attempt-
ing a VBAC is twice as costly than the cesarean may have cost.
27
in cesarean rates. This relation is estimated precisely despite controls for birth severity, risk
factors, demographics, female labor force attachment, hospital size, and fertility. We confront
the endogeneity problem that arises from the possibly joint determination of cesarean rates and
managed care enrollments by using state variation in laws that promote or hinder managed care
growth and operations. Our results indicate that the managed care activity can statistically
explain approximately 30 percent of the reduction in cesareans. Simple calculations at 1991-
1992 managed care levels and 1992 cesarean rates indicate that the medical (dollar) savings from
the HMO-induced reduction in cesarean rates amounted to over $15 million, as a conservative
estimate. We find no reduction in the contemporaneous “quality” of births, but temper our
findings due to reduced precision in this estimation.
There is more work for future research. First, there is a question of whether reductions in
managed care enrollments after 1991-1992 led to any change in the patterns obtained in this
study. After peaking in the early 1990s, managed care enrollments declined in the next few years
(AAHP, 1994). There would be a useful extension in understanding whether, for e.g., VBACs
emerged as the “practice norm” in obstetrics’ choices, preventing a reversal towards the high
cesarean rates of the late 1980s upon exogenous reductions in managed care. Second, it is of
importance to consider the “quality” aspect of deliveries that this study has begun to consider.
Although there is little evidence of reductions in quality in the 1991-1992 time period, recent
concerns in both the academic and popular press have suggested that cost pressures in HMOs
may have led them to adopt VBACs or natural childbirths for deliveries that might medically
be more suitable for cesareans; see Frigoletto et al (1999). These are topics of both academic as
well as policy interest, and should be a first priority for future research.
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The first term is unambiguously negative. The first order conditions for the traditional indemnity
insurance and the managed care physician are respectively
U tY (·) [ζ0(it)∆Y ] + U tL(·)[ζ0(it)(∆τ)] + U tI(·) = 0
UmL (·)[ζ0(im)∆τ ] + UmI (·) = 0.
Totally diﬀerentiating, replacing Bm = φB¯, Bt = (1 − φ)B¯ and noting that all terms except





Y Y (·)ζ(it)[−∆Y 2]ζ 0(it) + U tLL(·)ζ(it)[−∆τ2]ζ 0(it)− U tII(·)it

















U tY Y (·)ζ 0(it)∆Y [Y t/B¯] + ULL(·)ζ0(it)∆τ [{1− φ}[−τn(1− ζ(it)− τ cζ(it)] + U tII(·)(1− φ)it





UmLL(·)ζ0(im)∆τ [φ[−τn(1− ζ(im)− τ cζ(im)] + UmII(·)φim
UmLL(·)ζ 0(im)2φ∆τ2 + UmII(·)φ
< 0.
We are thus able to sign the first two components of equation (3.2).
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Table 1  




Percent of All 
Deliveries 
 



























 Source: Author’s calculations based on a random sample of NCHS data    
 for 1991 and 1992. There are 8032 total deliveries in this table and 1363   
 cesarean deliveries. 
 
Table 2a: Sample Means  
 
 All Counties West South North Central Northeast 


























.016 .017 .017 .016 .013 
Percent of births:       
Low Birthweight .006 .005 .006 .007 .007 
High Birthweight .034 .033 .036 .034 .034 
Fetal Distress .041 .037 .042 .039 .042 
Maternal Distress .040 .040 .044 .038 .041 
Breech Presentation .039 .039 .038 .040 .039 
Neo-natal infant mortality .021 .019 .017 .026 .019 
Birth injury/complication .002 .002 .002 .003 .002 
Low Apgar Score .020 .0001 .030 .026 .0001 
Percent of Mothers:      
Primary Cesarean .136 .123 .148 .131 .139 
Repeat Cesarean .081 .072 .080 .086 .087 
Age < 20 .171 .165 .197 .179 .131 
Age 20-30 .572 .565 .567 .585 .565 
Age 30-35 .189 .191 .173 .178 .224 
Age 36-40 .059 .068 .054 .050 .069 
Age 41-45 .007 .009 .006 .005 .008 
Age > 41  .0001 .0002 .0001 .0001 .0002 
Labor force participation .215 .206 .216 .215 .220 
Black .140 .041 .249 .118 .104 
White .827 .884 .727 .863 .870 
Married .721 .735 .690 .734 .730 
High School or less .575 .537 .603 .588 .553 
College or more .399 .377 .389 .405 .421 
Other      










Per capita income 











n 823 155 243 238 187 
Note: Data from NCHS, AAHP and ARF as described in text. Where present, standard deviations in 







Distribution of Laws  
 
 Number of  
states   
mandating law 
Percent of states mandating law,                              
within region 
  West Northeast South Central and  
N.Central 
Consumer Rep. 12 .37 .38 .06 .18 
Policy Role for 
Subscribers 
31 .81 .75 .46 .63 
Annual Relic. 23 .62 .13 .8 .36 
Open Enroll.  17 .37 .38 .2 .45 
Review 12 .27 .13 .26 .27 
HMO Alt. 11 .27 .5 .2 .22 
Dual Choice 14 .27 .63 .2 .36 








State Laws Regulating HMO Operations in 1991-1992: 
 
Consumer Rep:   1 if the state mandates consumer representatives on HMO boards, 0 otherwise.  
Policy Role:  1 if the state mandates a policymaking role for HMO subscribers, 0 otherwise. 
Annual Relic.:  1 if the state mandates an annual relicensure for HMOs, 0 otherwise.1 
Ext. Review: 1 if the state mandates an external body (whether the State Health.  
Commisioner, or another regulatory agency) to monitor the quality and       
enforcement of standards in HMOs, 0 if either the State explicitly forbids   
such monitoring or has no relevant provision for monitoring. 
Open Enroll: 1 if the state mandates open enrollment, 0 otherwise. 
HMO Alt: 1 if the state mandates employers to offer an HMO alternative, 0 otherwise 
Dual Choice:  1 if the state requires that employers with a minimum number of employees offer an 
  HMO alternative, 0 otherwise.2 
Federal HMO:  1 if the state mandates accommodation of the Federal HMO law, 0 otherwise.3  
                                                 
1 In 1991, states either had annual relicensing procedures or granted certificates for indefinite operations. One 
exception was Michigan which used a 3-year licensing period. For the variable Annual Relicensure, Michigan 
takes the value 1. 
2 Where this law is enforced in 1991, the minimum number of employees is 25 in all cases, except the state of 
Washington which requires 50 employees. 
3 Section 1311(c) of the Federal HMO act makes explicit provisions to counteract state laws that prevent “HMOs 
from doing business as such and from operating in accordance with section 1301 of the Act.” This Section of the 
act provides more lax conditions to counteract state regulations on stringency of i) medical society approval of 
services provided by HMOs, ii) number of physicians on government agencies, iii) capital or financial reserves; 
and, v) state laws that prevent HMOs from complying with the Federal HMO act (see State Law Compliance 
Guide, Section 1). 

Table 3 
OLS, Two Stage least squares (TSLS) and NLIV estimates  
 
Dependent 
variable:                  
Cesarean Rate HMO Market 
share 
 (1): OLS (2): TSLS (3): NLIV (4) 









  -.399 
(.113) 
 








































































































Federal HMO Law    .018 
(.010) 
Dual Choice    .008 
(.004) 
HMO Alternative    -.004 
(.015) 
Policy Role for 
Subscribers 
   -.022 
(.010) 
Open Enroll.    -.053 
(.012) 
Review    -.008 
(.005) 
Consumer Rep.    .078 
(.018) 
Adjusted/Pseudo R2 .3046 .3560 .3661 .5180 
F statistic [69,754]=7.1 [69,754]=7.0 [70,751]=7.08 [75,748]=14.5 
χ2 statistic    χ2[6] = 17.9 
 Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. For column (2), (3), std. Errors account correctly for the first  
 step. All regressions include state dummies, a year dummy, education variables, with  n=823. Hispanic     
 and Age < 20 are left out variables. For TSLS and NLIV, pseudo R2 is reported.  The χ2 statistic  




Cesarean Rates and Risk Factors: Fetal Distress, Maternal Distress, Breech Presentation 
 
Dependent Variable: Cesarean Rate Cesarean Rate HMO Market share 
 (1): 2SLS  (2): NLIV (3) 





(HMO Market share)2  -.386 
(.111) 
 






















-.097      
(.050) 


















Federal HMO Law       .020 
    (.010) 
Dual Choice     .012 
    (.011) 
HMO Alternative     -.006  
   (.015) 
Policy Role for 
Subscribers 
  -.023 
    (.010) 
Open Enroll.      -.055 
    (.012) 
Review     -.005 
   .009 
Consumer Rep.   .079 
   (.018) 
Adjusted/Pseudo R2  .3262 .3345 .5204 
F-statistic [72,751]=7.32 [73,750]=7.36 [78, 745]=15.7 
χ2 statistic   χ2 [9]=18.23 
Notes: Two-step standard errors in parenthesis.  Both regressions also include the entire set of regressors from 
Table 3, columns (2), (3). There are 823 observations used in each regression.  The χ2 statistic determines the 
validity of the exclusion restrictions used in estimation of column (1). A separate over-identifying test was 












Cesarean Rates and Labor Force Attachment  
 
      
 (1): TSLS (2): NLIV (3):TSLS (4): NLIV (5): Median 








-.1009   
 (.073) 
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(.009) 





























   (.286) 









   (.085) 









    (.032) 


















Pseudo R-squared .3337 .3439 .3626 .3721 .3631 
F-statistic [70,753]=7.75 [71,752]=7.84 [73,750]=8.31 [74,749]=8.38 [74,749]=8.10 
Notes: Two-step standard errors in parenthesis.  Both regressions also include the entire set of regressors from 
Table 3, columns (2), (3). There are 823 observations used in each regression.  In results not reported, the reduced 
















Primary Cesarean Rates and Repeat Cesarean Rates   
 
Dependent Variable: Primary Cesarean Rate Repeat Cesarean Rate 
 (1): TSLS  (2): NLIV (3): TSLS (2): NLIV 






.084    
(.116) 
(HMO Market share)2  -.330    
(.074) 
 -.193 
   (.151) 
Fertility Rate -1.12 
(.471) 
  -1.07 
    (.472) 
-.487 
(.218) 
-.469    
(.228) 
Low Birthweight  .712 
(.194) 






High Birthweight .523 
(.053) 




.549    
(.116)   








Fetal Distress .223 
(.338) 






Maternal Distress .746 
(.318) 





(.301)   







  (.115) 
Pseudo R-squared .3648 .3784 .1769 .1797 
F-statistic [72,751]=8.65 [71,750]=8.74 [72,751]=3.85 [71,750]=3.77 
Notes: Two-step standard errors in parenthesis.  Both regressions also include the entire set of regressors 
from Table 3, columns (2), (3). There are 823 observations used in each regression.  Instruments for 












Testing for Differential Responses to Increases and Declines in HMO Market shares 
 
   
 (1): TSLS (2): TSLS 
HMO Market share -.132 
 (.075) 
-.103   
 (.079) 
Decline*HMO 
 Market share 
.196   
(.332) 
.202    
(.382) 








Labor force attachment  -.460 
   (.103) 
Low Birthweight 1.84    
(.344) 
1.53   
(.355) 
High Birthweight .620 
(.101) 
.813    
(.115) 








Maternal Distress .736   
(.166) 
.740    
(.184) 
Breech Presentation .278   
(.095) 
.433   
(.110) 
Pseudo R-squared .3634 .3685 
F-statistic [76, 747]=8.00 [77,746]=8.05 
Notes: Two-step standard errors in parenthesis.  Both regressions also include the entire set of 
regressors from Table 3, columns (2), (3). There are 823 observations used in each regression.  
Separate reduced forms were estimated for HMO market share, Decline and the interaction variable. 
Also, for each of these, separate reduced forms were estimated with and without Labor force 












Effects on Quality Measures: Two Stage Least squares (TSLS) Estimates 
 




Low Apgar Score Rate 
 (1): TSLS (2): TSLS  (3): TSLS 






























High Birthweight .023  
(.025) 


































Pseudo R-squared .1849 .0458 .0135 
F-statistic [75,78] = 3.82 [74,79] = 1.97 [28, 348] = 1.04 
Notes: In column (3), there are only 320 observations. In the remaining regressions, n=823. Two-step standard 
errors in parenthesis.  Both regressions also include the entire set of regressors from Table 3, columns (2), (3). The 
reduced form for columns (1) and (3) consisted of birth injury as a regressor; the reduced form for column (2) was 
estimated without this additional control.  
 
 
